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‘… the interesting subject of the finances of the declining empire.’  
(Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Book I, ch. XVII)  
 
Introduction 
Toppling three tyrannies within four years is no mean achievement by the standards of 
any past global empire. Since 1999, Slobodan Milosevic, the Taliban, and now Saddam 
Hussein have all been overthrown as a result – admittedly an indirect result in the first 
case – of American military intervention against their armed forces. What makes this so 
remarkable is that it comes little more than a decade after a wave of anxiety about 
American “overstretch” and decline. In 1987 Paul Kennedy warned that the US was 
running  “the risk ... of what might roughly be called ‘imperial overstretch’.” America, he 
maintained, was spending too high a proportion of national income on its military 
commitments. This was already having an impact on the performance of the American 
economy compared with more or less demilitarized Germany and Japan, which were able 
to spend much more on civilian research and development. Could the US hope to 
preserve its Cold War position as a superpower? “The only answer to the question,” 
wrote Kennedy, “is ‘no’.”1   
 
Indeed, Kennedy went further, hinting at the dire domestic political consequences that 
might ensue from imperial overstretch. Citing the defense-driven growth in the federal 
debt under President Reagan, he drew a parallel with pre-revolutionary France – “the 
only other example which comes to mind of a Great Power so increasing its indebtedness 
in peacetime”.2  
 
As Keynes once said, when the facts change, one ought to change one’s opinion.3 Writing 
last September about America’s subsequent ascent from superpower to “hyperpower”, 
Kennedy invoked the deus ex machina of the “revolution in military affairs” to explain 
                                                 
1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), p. 689. 
2 Ibid., p. 681 and note. 
3 “If the facts change, I change my opinion. What do you do, sir?”: quoted in Joan Robinson, Economic 
Philosophy (London, 1962). 
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why his predictions of overstretch had not been fulfilled. All that investment in military 
R&D – of which he had been so disapproving back in the 1980s – had paid an unforeseen 
dividend.4 Not only did the Soviet Union collapse as it strained to match the Reagan-
Weinberger arms extravaganza. The US went on to collect a triple peace dividend in the 
1990s: falling defense spending as a share of GDP, accelerating economic growth, and a 
quantum leap in military capability that left other military powers far behind.  
 
The irony is that Kennedy’s original thesis of fiscal overstretch is about to be vindicated 
– at the very moment when he appears to have abandoned it. No doubt it is true that the 
US is now a military hyperpower. Its defense spending is equal to the combined military 
budgets of the next 12 or 15 nations. It can wage a war like the three-week campaign in 
Iraq at a cost of less than 1 per cent of its vast Gross Domestic Product. Yet America’s 
fiscal overstretch is nevertheless far worse today than anything Kennedy envisaged 16 
years ago.  
 
The key point – and here the resemblance with Kennedy’s earlier argument ends – is that 
this overstretch has almost nothing to with the United States’ overseas military 
commitments. It is the result of America’s chronically unbalanced domestic finances. 
And the magnitude of the problem is such that most Americans – even those who 
consider themselves well informed about the nation’s finances – find it quite literally 
incredible. Indeed, the main reason America’s fiscal crisis remains latent is precisely 
because people refuse to believe in its existence. We argue in this paper that it will be 
precisely when they wake up to the reality that American finances will “go critical”. 
 
I 
First, let us consider the extent of the country’s fiscal overstretch. Far from resulting from 
excessive military expenditures, it is primarily the result of a mismatch between earlier 
social security legislation, some of it dating back to the New Deal, and the changing 
demographics of American society.  
 
                                                 
4 Paul Kennedy, “Power and Terror”, Financial Times, September 3, 2002. 
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In just five years time, 77 million “baby boomers” will start collecting Social Security 
benefits.  In eight years they will start collecting Medicare benefits. By the time they are 
all retired, the United States will have doubled the number of its elderly population but 
increased by around 15 percent the number of workers able to pay for their benefits. Over 
time, a falling birthrate and lengthening life expectancy are a potent combination. 
 
Economists refer to the commitment to pay pension and medical benefits to current and 
future elderly as part of the government’s “implicit” liabilities. But these liabilities are no 
less real than the obligation to pay back the principal plus the interest on government 
bonds.  Indeed, politically speaking, it may be easier to default on explicit debt than to 
stop paying Social Security and Medicare benefits.  While no one can say for sure which 
liability the government would renege on first, one thing is clear: the implicitly liabilities 
dwarf the explicit ones.  Their size is so large as to render the U.S. government 
effectively bankrupt.   
 
The scale of this implicit insolvency has just been laid bare in an explosive paper by 
Jagadeesh Gokhale, a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and 
Kent Smetters, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Economic Policy at the U.S. 
Treasury and now an economics professor at the University of Pennsylvania. They asked 
the following question: Suppose the government could, today, get its hands on all the 
revenue it can expect to collect in the future, but had to use it, today, to pay off all its 
future expenditure commitments, including debt service.  Would the present value (the 
discounted value today) of the future revenues cover the present value of the future 
expenditures? The answer is a decided no.  According to their calculations, the shortfall is 
$44 trillion.5 To put that figure into perspective, it is twelve times larger than the current 
official debt and roughly four times the size of the country’s annual output.  
 
Gokhale and Smetters also asked by how much would taxes have to be raised or 
expenditures cut – on an immediate and permanent basis – to generate, in present value, 
                                                 
5 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters, “Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures For 
New Budget Priorities,” The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper, March 2002. 
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$44 trillion? Four alternative answers are reported in the table below. We could either, 
starting today, raise income taxes (individual and corporate) by 69 percent; or we could 
raise payroll taxes by 95 percent; or we could cut Social Security and Medicare benefits 
by 56 percent; or we could cut federal discretionary spending by more than 100 percent 
(which, of course, is not feasible).   
 
Table 1: Percentage increases in taxation or cuts in expenditure required today to 
achieve generational balance in US fiscal policy 
 
Policy Change 
Increase Federal Income Taxes + 69 % 
Increase Payroll Taxes + 95 % 
Cut Federal Purchases - 100% plus 
Cut Social Security and Medicare - 56 % 
 
Source: Gokhale and Smetters, “Fiscal and Generational Imbalances”. 
 
Another way of expressing the problem is to compare our own lifetime tax burden with 
the lifetime tax burden the next generation will have to shoulder if the government does 
not do one of the above. Hence the term often used to describe calculations like these: 
generational accounting. What these calculations imply is that anyone who has the bad 
luck to be born in America today, as opposed to back in the 1940s or 1950s, is going to 
be saddled throughout his working life with very high tax rates – potentially twice as high 
as those his parents or grandparents faced.  
 
There is, however, one serious problem with these figures: not with the calculations that 
underlie them, but with their acceptance. To put it bluntly, this news is so bad that 
scarcely anyone believes it.  
 
It is not that people are completely oblivious to the problem. It is common knowledge 
that we are living longer and that paying for the rising proportion of elderly people in the 
 5
population is going to be expensive.  What people do not yet realize is just how 
expensive. One common response is to say that the economists in question have a 
political ax to grind, and have therefore made assumptions calculated to paint the blackest 
picture possible.  
 
But the reality is that the Gokhale-Smetters study was commissioned by Paul O’Neill 
when he was Treasury Secretary and was meticulously prepared by while Smetters was 
working at the Treasury in conjunction with staff at the Treasury and the Office of 
Management and Budget. And far from being a worst-case scenario, the Gokhale and 
Smetters figures are based on what are arguably optimistic official assumptions about 
growth in future Medicare costs as well as about future increases in longevity.  The 
 
Historically, the annual growth rate in real Medicare benefits per beneficiary has 
exceeded that of labor productivity by 2.5 percentage points.  But official projections 
assume only a one percentage point differential in the future.  (They also assume, 
optimisitcally, that it will take us fifty years to achieve the current Japanese life 
expectancy.) Table 2 shows that under somewhat more realistic assumptions the total 
fiscal imbalance could be even larger than $44 trillion. In order to eliminate the fiscal 
imbalance altogether using Gokhale and Smetters’ methodology it is necessary to 
imagine a real long-term interest rate of X per cent, annual growth of per capita output of 
Y per cent and annual growth in the cost of Medicare of Z per cent [Larry: please can you 
provide some figures here]. 
 
Table 2. The Federal fiscal imbalance under eight sets of different assumptions 
Real long-term interest rate 3.6 3.9 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 t.c.
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.2 1.2 1.7 1.7 t.c.
Annual growth rate of Medicare benefits 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 2.2 3.2 2.2 t.c.
Fiscal imbalance (trillion dollars) 44 35 59 56 37 65 29 0
 
Source: Gokhale and Smetters, “Fiscal and Generational Imbalances”. 
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Perhaps predictably, the Treasury now denies that it had anything to do with the Gokhale 
and Smetters study. It would rather we read the supposedly independent Congressional 
Budget Office’s (CBO) ten-year budget forecasts, which are frequently cited in the press 
and are one of the principal reasons for the prevailing mood of complacency about fiscal 
policy.  
 
The credibility of the CBO’s forecasts is a perfect illustration of the phenomenon known 
to students of drama as the suspension of disbelief – the psychological quirk that allows 
movie audiences to feel excited when actors pretend to murder or make love to one 
another. Without even trying, we make believe that the soldiers in Saving Private Ryan 
really are getting shot at. This also operates in the financial world. Without even trying, 
investors make believe that the US government is in fact running a fiscal surplus. How 
does the CBO get us to suspend disbelief? The answer is: the same way a good movie 
director does it, namely with good special effects. 
 
During the Clinton administration, the CBO routinely projected that, regardless of 
inflation or economic growth, the federal government would spend precisely the same 
number of dollars, year in and year out, on everything apart from social security, 
Medicare, and other entitlements.  At the same time, the CBO confidently assumed 
federal taxes would grow at roughly 6 percent per year. As a result it was able to make 
dizzying forecasts of budget surpluses stretching as far as the CBO could see. (These 
phantom surpluses were the money Albert Gore promised to spend on voters and George 
Bush promised to return to them in the 2000 election.)   
 
With the election over, the CBO decided that failing to adjust projected discretionary 
spending for inflation (but not economic growth) was no longer “useful or viable”.  
Making this adjustment reduced the CBO’s projected 2002–2011 surplus from $6.8 
trillion to $5.6 trillion. But that was nothing compared with the impact of subsequent 
unforeseen events. Two years later, after a recession, a huge tax cut, September 11th, and 
the Iraq war, the projected ten-year surplus has fallen to $20 billion.  
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These factors notwithstanding, the CBO is still able to predict a medium-term decline in 
the federal debt in public hands from 35.5 per cent of GDP to 16.8 per cent ten years 
hence. The reason is that the CBO assumes that discretionary spending will remain fixed 
over the next decade even as the economy grows. In fact, these purchases have grown 
more than twice as fast as the economy over the last three years.  Suppose – to be 
optimistic – that from now on discretionary spending grows only as fast as the economy.  
Under that assumption, the $20 billion surplus turns into a $1.5 trillion deficit.  The 
difference between running a decadal surplus of $6.8 trillion and running a deficit of $1.5 
trillion is $8.3 trillion in additional red ink – more than twice the current outstanding 
stock of federal debt.   
 
Unfortunately, even if the CBO were not massaging its projections, it would still grossly 
understate the true size of the government’s liabilities because its “bottom line” is only 
that part of the federal government’s liabilities that takes the form of bonds. Publicly 
issued and traded debt is, however, simply dwarfed by the gargantuan off-balance-sheet 
liabilities of the Social Security and Medicare systems.  
 
Figure 1. 
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Source: Congressional Budget Office website. 
 
III 
Nobody can be surprised that in our political system the very unpleasant fiscal arithmetic 
revealed by generational accounting gets marginalized, not to say suppressed. The tax 
hikes and spending cuts needed to achieve long-term fiscal balance are so huge that most 
politicians simply avert their eyes from them. We cannot blame them. No sane 
presidential candidate would campaign with the slogan “Hike taxes by two-thirds.”  Nor 
is any rational incumbent likely to implement such a radical fiscal crunch.  It is, therefore, 
safe to assume that in the short run almost nothing will be done to address the problem. 
Which means the problem will just keep getting worse. According to Gokhale and 
Smetters, if policy were left unchanged until 2008, income taxes would have to go up 
even higher – by 74 per cent – to close the intergenerational gap.  
 
So what will happen? And when? The answers to both these questions depend on how 
quickly Americans wake up to fiscal reality. Perhaps the hardest thing to figure out is 
why they haven’t done so already. Even financially sophisticated Americans seem not to 
appreciate the fragility of the country’s fiscal position. Conventional wisdom predicts that 
if investors and traders in government bonds anticipate a growing imbalance in a 
government’s fiscal policy, they will sell that government’s bonds. There are good 
reasons for this. A widening gap between current revenues and expenditures is usually 
filled in two ways.  The first is by selling more bonds to the public. The second is by 
printing money.6  Either response leads to a decline in bond prices and a rise in interest 
rates – the incentive people need to purchase bonds.  That incentive has to be larger when 
the real return of principal plus interest on the bond is threatened by default or inflation.    
 
There is currently no sign of falling bond prices and rising interest rates. On the contrary: 
yields on 10-year Treasures have been heading downwards for more than twenty years. 
At their peak in 1981 they rose above 15 per cent. As recently as November 1994, they 
                                                 
6 See most recently Luis Catão and Marco E. Terrones, “Fiscal Deficits and Inflation”, International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 03/65 (2003). 
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were above 8 per cent. At the end of May 2003 they stood at 3.3 per cent. That is the 
lowest they have been since 1958 – a time when, if anyone had known about generational 
accounts, they would have been justly celebrating the good times ahead. (Back in 1958, 
the baby boom was still underway, Social Security was half its current size, and Medicare 
did not exist.)  
 
Figure 2. 
 
Source: Economagic (Federal Reserve Bank of New York). 
 
There are two possible explanations for the apparent insouciance of the bond market. One 
is that investors and traders know of a painless answer to the federal government’s 
coming fiscal crisis, which they are somehow managing to keep secret from the 
economics profession. The other is simply that they are “in denial”. Many of them are 
aware of the black hole. Some have even read the “menu of pain” summarized in the 
table above. But nobody wants to be the first to admit what it implies. Or maybe – to be 
fair – nobody can quite work out what it implies. We are, after all, in uncharted waters. 
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Previous fiscal crises were not like this, because most of a government’s liabilities took 
the form of official bonds, not statutory pledges to pay various index-linked benefits to 
citizens. Bond traders are used to a world in which governments in fiscal difficulties 
either default or allow inflation to erode the real value of their debts. They look at the 
United States and find it hard to envisage either scenario.  
 
For reasons quite unrelated to federal fiscal policy, there are strong deflationary pressures 
operating at home and abroad. Overcapacity generated during the 1990s boom, investor 
pessimism in the wake of the bust, consumer anxiety about job losses – all these things 
mean that virtually the only sector of the US economy still buoyant is housing, for the 
simple reason that mortgage rates are the lowest in two generations. Meanwhile, the 
unleashing of China’s productive energies is filling the global economy with amazingly 
cheap consumer goods. Small wonder bond traders are betting – to judge by the current 
yield curve – on continuing low inflation. True, two important indicators suggest a slight 
upward shift in investors’ inflationary expectations. First, the yield curve, which had 
become more or less flat by the late 1990s has become more steeply sloped upwards in 
the course of the past two years. At the end of 2000, the spread between 90-day and 30-
year interest rates was slightly negative (minus 42 basis points). At the end of May 2003 
it stood at 326 basis points.  
 
Figure 3.  
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Source: Bondsonline.com. 
 
Secondly, the spread between yields on ten-year bonds and index-linked bonds with the 
same maturity has widened slightly, from around 140 basis points in October last year to 
over 200 basis points in February, though it has since fallen back to 169 bps.  Still, these 
figures are hardly indicative of serious inflationary fears. At the time of writing, one of 
the lead stories on the Bloomberg website describes deflation as “great bugaboo 
menacing the markets and the economy in the early 2000s”.7 On May 22 the Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, acknowledged that there was a “possibility” of 
deflation in his most recent testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of 
Congress.8 
 
Figure 4. 
                                                 
7 Chet Currier, ‘Deflation-defense Strategy Uses Treasuries, Cash’, www.bloomberg.com, April 26, 2003. 
8 David Leonhardt, “Greenspan, Broadly Positive, Spells Out Deflation Worries”, May 22, 2003. 
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Source: Economagic. 
 
There is, however, another way of looking at the bond traders’ mindset. Compare their 
predicament with that of their colleagues (now in many cases former colleagues) trading 
equities just five years ago. At that time, it was privately acknowledged by nearly 
everyone on Wall Street and publicly acknowledged by most economists that American 
stocks – especially those in the technology sector – were wildly overvalued. In 1996 Alan 
Greenspan famously declared that the stock market was suffering from “irrational 
exuberance”. Over the next three years, a succession of economists sought to explain why 
the future profits of American companies could not possibly be high enough to justify 
their giddy stock market valuations. Still the markets rose. It was not until January 2000 
that the bubble burst.9 
 
Could something similar be going on in today’s bond market? Just as investors and 
traders knew that most Internet companies could never earn enough to justify their 1999 
                                                 
9 See Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, 2000). 
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valuations, investors and traders today know that future government revenues cannot 
remotely cover both the interest on the federal debt and the transfers due on the 
government’s implicit liabilities. But just as participants in the stock market were the 
mental prisoners of a five-year bull market, so participants in the bond market today are 
the mental prisoners of a twenty-year bond bull market that has seen the price of long-
term Treasuries rise by a factor of two and a half in twenty years (figure 5). In both cases, 
everyone knows there is going to be a “correction.” But nobody wants to be the first 
player out of the market – who then has to sit and watch the bull-run continue for another 
year.  
 
Since January 2000, the Dow Jones Industrials index has declined by almost exactly 30 
per cent as irrational exuberance has given way to rational gloom. It is certainly not hard 
to imagine a similar correction to the bond market at some point in the near future. The 
difficult thing is to predict what will trigger it. 
 
Figure 5. 
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Source: Global Financial Data. 
 
IV 
When trying to make financial matters more vivid, writers often invoke imagery from the 
natural world. Bubbles burst. Bears chase bulls. So vast is America’s looming fiscal crisis 
that it is tempting to talk about the fiscal equivalent of the perfect storm – or the perfect 
earthquake, if you prefer; even the perfect forest fire. In this case, however, nature offers 
more than mere literary color. For the dynamics of fiscal overstretch really do have much 
in common with the dynamics of natural disasters. Like a really big earthquake, we can 
know only that a big fiscal crisis will happen. What we cannot know is when it will 
strike, nor the size of the shock. Adopting the language used by scientists who study the 
unpredictable pattern of earthquakes and forest fires, we are condemned to wait and see 
when our fiscal system will enter “self-sustaining criticality” – in other words, when it 
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will go critical, passing with dramatic speed and violence from one equilibrium to 
another.10  
 
The simplest example of this is what happens when you try to add to a pile of dry sand. If 
you drop more sand on top of it, one grain at a time, the pile keeps growing higher for a 
while. But then suddenly – and there is no way of knowing which grain will make it 
happen – the pile collapses. That collapse is when the pile of sand goes critical. 
Something not wholly dissimilar happens when one of the earth’s tectonic plates pushes 
once too often against another along a fault line – and causes an earthquake. Now 
translate this into the world of mammals, which – unlike particles of sand – have 
consciousness. Imagine a herd of cattle quietly grazing while you and your badly 
disciplined dog take a walk through a field. At first, one or two cows on the periphery 
spot you. Then a couple more. They start to feel and act a little nervously. But it is only 
when your dog barks that the whole herd stampedes. A stampede is the self-sustaining 
criticality of mammals panicking. 
 
What will panic the mammals who buy and sell bonds for a living? All the material 
ingredients for the fiscal crisis are, as we have seen, already in place. But the all-
important sand pile is composed of the expectations of millions of individuals. Like 
grains of sand, little bits of bad news are dropped on us, day after day, week after week. 
Like the sand pile, we can go a long time before the cumulative weight of these grains of 
bad news causes us to alter the shape of our expectations. But one day something happens 
– maybe just one extra grain of bad news – that triggers the shift from equilibrium into 
self-sustaining criticality.  Everything, therefore, depends on what bond traders expect the 
government to do about the $44 trillion black hole, and what might happen to change the 
irrationally exuberant expectations they currently hold.  
 
The printing press is the time-honored last resort of governments that cannot pay their 
bills out of current tax revenue or new bond sales.  It leads, of course, to inflation and, 
                                                 
10 For a popular introduction to the subject see Mark Buchanan, Ubiquity: The Science of History … Or 
Why the World Is Simpler Than We Think (London, 2000). 
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potentially, hyperinflation.  The higher the anticipated rate of inflation is, the higher 
interest rates will rise because nobody wants to lend money and be paid back in 
banknotes whose real value has been watered down by rising prices. The process 
whereby current fiscal policy influences expectations about future inflation is a dynamic 
one with powerful feedback effects. If financial markets decide a country is broke and is 
going to inflate, they act in ways that make that outcome more likely.  By pushing up 
interest rates, they raise the cost of financing the government’s debt and hence worsen its 
fiscal position. Higher interest rates may also depress business activity. Firms stop 
borrowing and start laying off workers. The attendant recession lowers tax receipts and 
drives the government into a deeper fiscal hole.  In desperation, the government starts 
printing money and lending it, via the banking system, to the private sector.  The 
additional money leads to inflation and the higher inflation rates assumed by the market 
turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, the private sector and the government find 
themselves in a game of chicken.  If the government can convince the private sector it 
can pay its bills without printing money, interest rates stay down.  If it cannot, interest 
rates go up, and the government may be forced to print money sooner rather than later.   
 
This suggests one possible scenario. Bondholders will start to sell off as soon as a critical 
mass of them (a) recognize that the government’s implicit and explicit liabilities are too 
much for it to handle with conventional fiscal policy and (b) conclude that the only way 
the government will be able to pay its bills is by printing money. What commonly 
triggers such shifts in expectations is an item of financial news. In Germany in May 1921 
– to give an extreme example – it was the announcement of a staggering post-war 
reparations burden of 132 billion marks that convinced investors the government’s fiscal 
position was incompatible with currency stability. The assassination of the liberal Foreign 
Minister Walther Rathenau in July of the following year delivered the coup de grace, 
sending both interest rates and exchange rates sky-rocketing.11 America today is a long 
way from being the Weimar Republic, plainly. But an item of fiscal news could 
nevertheless conceivably cause a major shift in inflationary expectations and hence in 
                                                 
11 For a good illustration see Stephen B. Webb, “Fiscal News and Inflationary Expectations in Germany 
after World War I”, in Journal of Economic History, 46, 3 (1986), pp. 769-94 
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long-term interest rates. The trigger for a shift in this case might be the publication of 
government deficit data significantly higher than those forecast by the CBO. Another 
potential flashpoint might be Alan Greenspan’s retirement at some point in the next two 
years (though judging by the muted reaction to the seventy-seven year old’s recent 
warnings about the Bush administration’s “lack of fiscal discipline”, his power to move 
the markets is not what it was).   
 
A third possibility is that the panic might not begin among American investors. 
According to data published in September 2002, foreign investors currently own close to 
two-fifths of the federal debt held in private hands (figure 6). The much-vaunted 
“hyperpower” would quickly find itself humbled if foreigners were to express their anti-
Americanism by dumping US Treasuries.12 Conventional wisdom has it that there is 
“nowhere else to go” for international investors seeking low risk securities in the world’s 
reserve currency. However, this overlooks the growing importance of euro-denominated 
securities in the wake of European monetary union. To begin with, the volume of euro-
denominated government bonds was very large even before the single currency was 
introduced: in 1998 the outstanding volume of Eurozone government bonds was roughly 
half the outstanding volume of US government bonds.13 Secondly, as the rapid 
convergence of Eurozone bond yields clearly shows, monetary union has greatly reduced 
pre-1999 country risk, so that (in effect) all Eurozone countries’ bonds are regarded as 
being almost as good as the old German bunds. Thirdly, net issuance has been 
significantly boosted by EMU: according to the Bank for International Settlements, 
around 44 per cent of net international bond issuance has been denominated in euros 
since the first quarter of 1999, compared with 48 per cent in dollars. For the equivalent 
period before the introduction of the euro the respective shares were 29 per cent and 53 
per cent.14 Fourthly, for all its crudeness, the Growth and Stability Pact notionally 
imposes tight constraints on the fiscal policies of Eurozone members – though whether 
                                                 
12 For the view that this has already begun, see ‘Return of Capital Fears Boost the Euro’, Financial Times, 
April 15, 2003. 
13 Jean-Pierre Danthine, Francesco Giavazzi and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, “European Financial Markets 
after EMU: A First Assessment”, NBER Working Paper 8044 (Dec. 2000), table 2.2. 
14 Bank for International Settlements. This was predicted by the BIS: Robert N. McCauley and William R. 
White, “The Euro and European Financial Markets”, BIS Working Paper, May 1997. 
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the rule restricting deficits to 3 per cent of GDP will be enforced this year remains to be 
seen. EMU may not have boosted economic growth in the Eurozone but it has certainly 
enhanced fiscal and monetary credibility for the member states. Finally, unlike the US, 
the Eurozone runs a balance of payments surplus. The possibility that investors may 
come to regard to the euro as being as good as the dollar when it comes to denominating 
low risk securities cannot be excluded. Indeed, it may already be happening. Since 
February last year, the dollar has declined against the euro by 28 per cent. Significantly, 
since 1997 US long-term bond yields have been between 10 and 70 basis points higher 
than Eurozone yields, having been lower for all but two of the previous twenty years.15  
 
Figure 6. 
 
Source: US Treasury, citing the Federal Reserve Board Treasury International Capital Survey. 
 
A plausible sequence of events might therefore run like this. The Congressional Budget 
Office suffers a blow to its credibility as the government posts a 4 per cent deficit. 
                                                 
15 Figures from Economagic, OECD. 
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Greenspan steps down. The dollar slides further.  Long-term interest rates edge up.  The 
IMF publishes a report criticizing US fiscal imbalances.16  Long-term interest rates rise 
some more.  Inflation picks up due to higher import prices, which is due to the weaker 
dollar.  Long-term interest rates move into the double-digit range. The Fed starts printing 
money to lower rates, but this raises long-term rates even further.  The economy moves 
into recession.  Deficits now exceed 5 percent of GDP.  Inflation hits double digits.  The 
government is forced to raise taxes, depressing the economy further.  
 
One reason this scenario has at least superficial plausibility is that it echoes past events. 
Although few bond traders have history degrees, they recollect that the high bond yields 
of the early Eighties were in large measure a consequence of the inflationary fiscal and 
monetary policies of the previous decade. Nor do the Seventies furnish the only historical 
precedent for inflationary outcomes of fiscal crises. As is well known, printing money 
helps a government in fiscal difficulties in three ways.  First, the government gets to 
exchange intrinsically worthless pieces of paper for real goods and services. The second 
fiscal advantage of inflation is that it waters down the real value of official debt.   At the 
end of the First World War all the major European combatants had run up immense 
public debts with nominal values in excess of around two years’ national income. But by 
1923 the Germans had got rid of nearly all of theirs by printing so much paper money 
that the real value of government bonds fell close to zero. Thirdly, if the salaries of 
government workers are paid with a lag or are only partially adjusted for inflation, 
inflation will lower their real incomes.  The same holds true for welfare, social security, 
and other government transfer payments – provided they are not index-linked.  In Russia 
in January 1992 inflation hit its post-Communist peak of 296 per cent a month, but 
                                                 
16 This has already happened informally. At a press conference on April 9, 2003, the chief economist at the 
IMF, Kenneth Rogoff, said as follows: “Let's suppose for a minute that we were talking about a developing 
country that had gaping current account deficits year after year, as far as the eye can see, of five percent or 
more, with budget ink spinning from black into red, with the likely deficit to GDP ratio for general 
government debt exceeding five percent this year, open-ended security costs, and a real exchange rate that 
had been inflated by capital inflows, with all that, I think it's fair to say we would be pretty concerned. 
Well, the U.S. is not an emerging market. It is, in fact, the greatest engine of economic growth in the 
history of the modern world. But I still think it's fair to say that at least a little bit of that calculus still 
applies” (transcript of the World Economic Outlook Press Conference, IMF website). 
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increases in government transfer payments (especially pensions and some salaries) lagged 
far behind.17  
 
But is a 1970s-style inflation really the only way America’s coming fiscal crisis can 
unfold? One reason why not is that only a modest proportion of the federal government’s  
$44 trillion budget gap would in fact be reduced through a jump in inflation of the sort 
described above. First, much of the government’s tradable debt is of short maturity – 
indeed fully a third of it has a maturity of one year or less (see figure 7). That makes it 
much harder to inflate away, because any increase in inflationary expectations will force 
the government to pay much higher interest rates when it seeks to renew these short-dated 
bonds.  
 
Secondly, Social Security benefits are protected against inflation via an annual inflation 
adjustment. Medicare benefits are also effectively inflation-proof because the government 
unquestioningly pays whatever bills it receives. Thirdly, government workers are not 
likely to sit idly and watch prices outpace their wages.  We tend not to think of the United 
States as a country with powerful labor unions, but the power of public sector employees 
should not be underestimated. Any attempt to erode their real wages by a pay freeze 
during a sudden bout of inflation would surely elicit a strong reaction, if not a strike.  
 
For all these reasons, a rerun of the 1970s would not solve the federal government’s fiscal 
problems. It would merely compound them. What, then, are the alternatives? 
 
Figure 7. 
                                                 
17 See Niall Ferguson and Brigitte Granville, “’Weimar on the Volga’: Causes and consequences of 
inflation in 1990s Russia compared with 1920s Germany”, Journal of Economic History, 60, 4 (December 
2000), pp. 1061-1087. 
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Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States (2001), table 552. 
 
 
V 
The Bush administration’s approach to the impending federal fiscal crisis appears, 
surprisingly, to be a variation on Lenin’s old slogan: “The worse the better.” Faced with 
the perfect fiscal storm, the President and his men appear to have decided to punch a hole 
in the boat by pushing through not one but two major tax cuts. Their initial proposal to 
Congress this year was for tax reductions totaling $726 billion. Whatever the merits of 
reforming the double taxation of dividends, this measure has sometimes been defended 
by administration spokesmen as designed to stimulate economic activity – a version of 
the “voodoo economics” dismissed by the President’s father. Sadly, in the real world, 
cutting taxes raises consumption, which lowers saving, which lowers investment, which 
reduces the amount of equipment and other capital per worker, which lowers workers’ 
wages, which lowers their tax payments.  This reduction in the tax base reinforces the 
direct loss in revenues associated with cutting tax rates.  
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Some proponents of a tax cut as a stimulus argue that reducing certain taxes, like 
dividend taxes, gives people a greater incentive to save. To illustrate the point, imagine a 
70 year-old who receives a $1,000 tax break on his dividends.  For that tax break to 
contribute to national saving, he needs to lower his consumption.  So he needs to not only 
save the entire $1,000 check, but to drop his spending below the level he was at and add 
to the $1,000 he has already decided to save.  This is not how people behave, nor even 
how economic theory predicts they should behave. Yes, lower taxes on dividends gives 
the beneficiary an incentive to consume less today in order to consume more tomorrow.  
But it also gives him an incentive to consume more, because tax cuts have income effects 
as well as substitution (incentive) effects. Even if they did not, the expansion of the tax 
base from cutting taxes would need to be very large to offset the direct loss of revenues 
associate with lowering tax rates.   
 
In fact, one viable fiscal solution to generational imbalance has already been 
implemented in Britain: that is simply to break the link between the state pension and 
wages. In 1979 the newly elected government of Margaret Thatcher discreetly reformed 
the long-established basic state pension, which was increased each year in line with the 
higher of two indices: the retail price index or the average earnings index. In her first 
budget, Thatcher amended the rule for increasing the basic pension so that it would rise in 
line with the retail price index only, breaking the link with average earnings.18 The short-
run fiscal saving involved was substantial, since the growth of earnings was much higher 
than inflation after 1980 (around 180 per cent to 1995, compared with 120 per cent). The 
long-run saving was greater still: the UK’s unfunded public pension liability today is a 
great deal smaller than those of most continental governments: as little as 5 per cent for 
the period to 2050, compared with 70 per cent for Italy, 105 per cent for France and 110 
per cent for Germany.19 This and other Thatcher reforms are the reason the UK is one of 
the elite of developed economies which do not facing a major hole in their generational 
accounts. Interestingly, the others are nearly all ex-British colonies: Australia, Canada, 
                                                 
18 Details in Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London, 1992), p. 37. 
19 Gabriel Stein, ‘Mounting Debts: The Coming European Pension Crisis’, Politeia, Policy Series No. 4, 
(1997), pp. 32−5. 
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Ireland and New Zealand. According to international comparisons done in 1998, each of 
these countries could have achieved generational balance with tax increases of less than 5 
per cent.20 
 
Could it happen in the United States? The answer is that it seems unlikely in view of the 
growing political organization and self-consciousness of the American elderly. If you 
spend a little time in Florida, you are bound to see the sticker “I’m Spending My Kids’ 
Inheritance” on scores of car bumpers.  Fifty years ago such sentiments were seldom 
uttered. But attitudes and behavior have changed.  Economic research shows conclusively 
that the elderly as a group are indeed consuming with next to no regard for their adult 
children. If the elderly were altruistic toward their adult children, government policies 
that took money from grown children and gave it to their parents would change neither 
party’s consumption.  The reason is that the parents would simply hand the money back 
to the children in the form of gifts or bequests.  It is easy to test for such intergenerational 
altruism.  All that is necessary is to see if government transfers from the young to the old 
increase the consumption of the old relative to the young.  The American government has 
spent half a century taking ever larger sums from workers and handing them to retirees in 
the form of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid benefits.  The result has been a 
doubling of consumption per retiree relative to consumption per worker.  Indeed, retirees 
now appear to consume more, on average, than workers.  
 
The absence of significant voluntary intergenerational transfers between the old and the 
young helps explain why Social Security is sometimes referred to as the “third rail” by 
American politicians. Politicians who touch it by suggesting any cut in benefits will 
receive a violent political shock from the American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP). Mindful of the British experience in the 1980s, the AARP has already 
commissioned a study showing what the effect would be if an American government 
replaced the link between the state pension and wages with a link to inflation. It 
concludes that price indexation would cause the average replacement rate (benefit as a 
                                                 
20 Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfritz (eds.), Generational Accounting Around the 
World (Chicago, 1999). 
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percentage of pre-retirement income) to drop by half over a period of 75 years, 
“fundamentally changing the relationship between workers’ contributions and the 
benefits they receive”.21  
 
Quite why today’s elderly should worry about the level of pensions 75 years hence is not 
altogether clear. Nevertheless, such arguments resonate not only among the retired but 
also among the soon-to-retire. Ageing baby-boomers are now so old that they have a 
bigger stake in preserving their future benefits than in lowering their current payroll 
taxes.  Indeed, many have already joined the AARP, which sends Americans application 
forms on their fiftieth birthdays.  
 
So are there any viable policies an American President could adopt without risking 
electoral oblivion? The first thing must be to bring Medicare spending under control. 
Medicare is in fact responsible for the lion’s share – 82 percent – of the $44 trillion 
budget black hole.  Since 1970, the rate of growth of real Medicare benefits per 
beneficiary has exceeded that of labor productivity by 2.4 percentage points.  The $44 
trillion figure assumes, optimistically, that in the future the growth rate of Medicare 
benefits per beneficiary will exceed productivity growth by only 1 percentage point. Just 
cutting the growth rate of Medicare benefits per beneficiary by half a percentage point 
per year would shave $15 trillion off the $44 trillion long-term budget gap. There must be 
a way of capping the program’s growth without jeopardizing its ability to deliver 
critically important health insurance protection to the elderly.   
 
The President’s scheme for limiting Medicare growth effectively bribes the elderly with a 
drug benefit to join HMOs. This approach has three flaws.  First, the benefit he proposes 
is fabulously expensive – $400 billion to $1 trillion over ten years, and that’s if we’re 
lucky.  Secondly, his scheme retains the traditional and very expensive fee-for-service 
Medicare system and permits the elderly to switch back to it whenever they like. 
Unfortunately, they are likely to switch back just when they are becoming expensive to 
                                                 
21 Alison Shelton, Laurel Beedon, and Mitja Ng-Baumhackl, “The Effect of Using Price Indexation Instead 
of Wage Indexation in Calculating the Initial Social Security Benefit,” AARP Public Policy Institute, July 
2002. 
 25
treat.  Thirdly, the HMOs are free to shut down and ship their customers back to the 
traditional plan whenever their clients become too expensive.   
 
The key, then, to meaningful Medicare reform is to eliminate entirely the traditional fee-
for-service option and give all Medicare participants a voucher to purchase private health 
insurance.  But would this not leave them at the mercy of the private health insurance 
industry, which will seek to insure only the healthiest among them? The answer is no, 
provided the vouchers handed to the elderly are weighted according to their health 
status.22  Thus an 80-year old with pancreatic cancer might get a $100,000 voucher, while 
an 80-year old who is in perfect shape might get only a $5,000 voucher.  The vouchers 
would be determined each year in light of the participant’s health status at the end of that 
year.  Having fixed a total amount to be spent on Medicare, the government can readily 
determine the amount of each voucher.  Hence, total Medicare expenditures will be 
rigidly set.  The major objection to this proposal is the loss of participants’ privacy since 
they will have to reveal their medical histories to a government-appointed doctor.  But 
this seems a small price to pay to regain some measure of fiscal sanity.  
 
The second key policy is to privatize Social Security, but in such a way that the current 
elderly help rather than hinder reform.  One way to do this would be to close down the 
old system at the margin and enact a federal retail sales tax to pay off, through time, its 
accrued liabilities.  What workers would otherwise have paid in payroll taxes would now 
be invested in special private retirement accounts, to be split 50-50 between spouses.  The 
government would make matching contributions for poor workers.  And it would 
contribute fully on behalf of the disabled and the unemployed.   Finally, all account 
balances would be invested in a global, market-weighted index of stocks, bonds and real 
estate.     
 
Will either of these policies be implemented? We are not optimistic, since each would 
entail sacrifices by the retired – as the AARP would hasten to point out.  
 
                                                 
22 We owe this policy proposal to Dr. John Goodman, President of the National Center for Policy Analysis.  
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Conclusion 
There is one other, more drastic, possibility. It is usually assumed that outright default on 
the government’s implicit liabilities is unlikely. Is it? Let us suppose that we are right 
about the risk of a major change in expectations about America’s fiscal future. If the bond 
market does “go critical” – if, in other words, investors suddenly start to fear an 
inflationary outcome of the federal fiscal crisis – then an executive like this one, which is 
as attracted to reductions in Social Security as it is to reductions in taxation, might seize 
the moment of national emergency. And it would indeed be a national emergency. A 
government facing a steep increase in its borrowing costs would confront a large and 
powerful social group determined to defend their entitlements.  
 
Such a scenario has one obvious historical precedent. In ancien régime France the biggest 
burden on royal finances did not take the form of bonds but the salaries due to tens of 
thousands of office holders – men who had simply bought a government sinecure and 
expected to be paid in return a salary for life. These were the most important part of the 
dette exigible. All attempts to reduce these implicit liabilities within the existing political 
system simply failed. It was only after the outbreak of the Revolution – arguably a direct 
consequence of the fiscal crisis of the monarchy – that the offices were abolished. The 
office holders were compensated by cash payments in a new currency – the assignats – 
which within a few years were reduced to worthlessness by the revolutionary printing 
presses.23 The parallel has two implications. First, when fiscal systems go critical there 
can be big political consequences. Second, vested interests that resist necessary fiscal 
reforms can end up losing much more heavily from a revolutionary solution.  
 
Perhaps, then, Paul Kennedy was not so wrong to draw parallels between modern 
America and pre-revolutionary France. Bourbon France, like America today, had 
pretensions to imperial grandeur. But she was ultimately wrecked by a curious kind of 
overstretch. It was not their overseas adventures that did it for the Bourbons. Indeed, 
Louis XVI’s last foreign war – in support of the rebellious American colonists – was a 
                                                 
23 Richard Bonney, ‘France, 1494−1815’, in idem (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 
1200−1815 (Oxford, 1999), pp. 131ff., 152f. Cf. J. F. Bosher, French Finances, 1770−1795  (Cambridge, 
1970) 
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huge strategic success. The overstretch was internal, and at its very heart was a black hole 
of implicit liabilities.  
 
As Gibbon said, the finances of a declining empire do indeed make an interesting subject. 
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